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Who is responsible for the photovoltaic environment after Suntech goes bankrupt
In recent days, discussions about the fate of Suntech and the broader photovoltaic industry have been widespread online and offline. Once considered the "aircraft carrier" of China’s solar energy sector, how did Suntech end up in insolvency? What challenges does China's PV industry face? A reporter from *Science and Technology Daily* conducted an in-depth interview to explore these questions.
The wealth effect has drawn many entrepreneurs into the photovoltaic sector, turning it into a "sweet potato" for those seeking quick profits. According to Professor An Wen, director of the Low-Carbon Institute at Hohai University, many business leaders had no prior interest in photovoltaics. However, after companies like Wuxi Suntech and Changzhou Trina Solar went public, the industry became highly attractive, drawing attention from investors and entrepreneurs alike.
An Wen, who has long studied new energy technologies, noted that many companies were driven by the promise of explosive growth, akin to a wild horse running out of control. He pointed out that the lure of financial gains led many firms to act irrationally, believing they could simply import foreign equipment, hire experts, and scale production quickly.
As more companies entered the market, China's photovoltaic capacity surged, accounting for over half of the global total. Jiangsu alone contributed more than 55% of the country's solar exports. Companies like Suntech, Trina, and Aters once ranked among the top ten globally.
However, the industry remained heavily dependent on foreign technology in the upstream sectors, such as silicon and ingot production. With the domestic market underdeveloped, over 90% of China’s PV products were exported, creating a "two ends out" situation—relying on foreign tech and foreign markets.
Miao Liansheng, chairman of Yingli Group, warned that if European markets closed off, it would be a disaster for the entire sector. Some scholars even questioned why no one had prepared for the potential crisis.
Local governments also played a key role, driven by GDP growth. According to reports, over 100 cities in China established photovoltaic industrial bases, with some estimates suggesting the number may exceed 300. Many parks aimed for production targets exceeding RMB 100 billion, far beyond actual demand.
Shi Zhengrong, founder of Suntech, criticized this trend as irresponsible. An Wen explained that local officials saw photovoltaics as a way to boost GDP while promoting green energy, aligning with national development goals.
Yet, this enthusiasm lacked proper planning. Gong Xuejin, former vice president of Suntech, noted that China's lack of a scientific top-level design left the industry vulnerable. Unlike countries like the U.S., which launched the “Million Solar Roofs†program in 1997, or Germany, which popularized rooftop power stations years ago, China lagged in strategic foresight.
Gong emphasized that while the global PV industry is adjusting, there are still opportunities amid the crisis. The government should implement stronger policies to counter the "double reverse" pressure from Europe and the U.S., while accelerating domestic solar projects and roof installations.
Jiang Zhongwei, manager of Jiangsu Wuxi Huite Solar Energy Technology Co., Ltd., warned that without strong government intervention, the export challenges would only worsen. He feared that the collapse of Suntech was just the beginning.